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Abstract 
 From a sample of Islamic banks around the world from 1997 to 2012, this paper 
examines whether loan loss provisioning in Islamic banks is procyclical. Our 
empirical findings highlight that loan loss provisioning in Islamic banks remains 
procyclical, although the „expected‟ loan loss model (E-LLM) has been implemented 
for Islamic banks in several countries. A closer investigation further documents that 
Islamic banks also use loan loss provisions for discretionary managerial actions, 
especially related to capital management in which loan loss reserves and provisions 
are inflated when bank capitalization declines. Eventually, this paper highlights that 
higher capitalization can mitigate the procyclicality of loan loss provisions in Islamic 
banks. In other words, loan loss provisioning becomes countercyclical for Islamic 
banks with higher capitalization. This paper therefore casts doubts on the adoption of 
the E-LLM for Islamic banks to promote countercyclical effects, because the E-LLM 
may be influenced by managerial discretion, including opportunistic capital 
management using loan loss provisions that may undermine the importance of 
maintaining sufficient bank capitalization.  
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1. Introduction 
  Since the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis, prudential regulation in 
banking has emphasized the need for a forward-looking model of bank credit risk 
management (Elnahass et al., 2016). It is widely admitted that when using a 
backward-looking model, banks tend to exacerbate procyclical effects by lowering 
credit standards during economic booms and hence, increasing the likelihood of 
financial distress (Bushman and Williams, 2012; Wezel, 2010). Similarly, banks also 
tend to become risk averse during economic downturns by tightening credit standards, 
which in turn deepens economic recessions.   
  In December 2011, the FSAB (Financial Accounting Standard Board)  and the 
IASB (International Accounting Stardard Board) proposed a change in credit risk 
modeling for conventional banks using the „expected‟ loan loss model (E-LLM) 
instead of the „incurred‟ loan loss model (I-LLM) as described in Elnahass et al. 
(2016). As a matter of fact, the I-LLM was established following the IAS39 
frameworks, where loan loss provisions are made after non-performing loans have 
materialized. In this context, the I-LLM is a backward-looking model that does not 
enable banks to create provisions during economic booms, which in turn triggers 
procyclical effects. Meanwhile, the E-LLM follows the IFRS9 frameworks in which 
loan loss provisions should be created before loans are disbursed, allowing banks to 
have sufficient provisions in good times in order to enable lending expansion during 
economic downturns.  
  For conventional banks, the adoption of the E-LLM has been delayed until 
2018. Unlike in conventional banks, the E-LLM has been adopted by Islamic banks at 
least since 2010, particularly in countries adopting the AAOIFI (Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions). In fact, the provisioning 
system enacted in the AAOIFI already follows the approach of the E-LLM (Sarea and 
Hanefah, 2013; Elnahass et al., 2016). Yet, the use of the E-LLM for Islamic banks is 
also mandatory for several countries that have adopted the AAOIFI, such as Bahrain, 
Jordan and Qatar (Zoubi and Al-Khazali, 2007; Taktak et al., 2010; Elnahass et al., 
2016). 
    While the I-LLM is perceived to aggravate procyclical effects in bank lending, 
criticism over the E-LLM also occurs, because the E-LLM requires sophisticated 
valuations and relies substantially on managerial discretion. Elnahass et al. (2016) 
further emphasize three major critics of the E-LLM. First, relying on managerial 
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discretion in projecting future cash flows and building up loan loss provisions using 
the E-LLM may undermine the need for a reliable and accountable financial report 
(Wezel, 2010; Ernst and Young, 2014a). Second, the E-LLM is less transparent than 
the I-LLM in terms of methodology and thus, the E-LLM enables banks to conceal a 
deteriorating loan portfolio. Third, the E-LLM also enables banks to smooth income 
due to a lack of transparency in the model, exacerbating risk taking during economic 
booms (Bushman and Williams, 2012).  
  In line with such criticism, a broad literature indeed highlights that 
conventional banks may use loan loss provisions for opportunistic managerial actions 
(Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008 & 2012; Anandarajan et al., 2007; Lobo and Yang, 
2001; Ahmed et al., 1999). Nonetheless, previous studies also advocate the 
importance of a dynamic provisioning system using the E-LLM for conventional 
banks, although the E-LLM enables bank managers to act opportunistically. This is 
due to the fact that the current provisioning practice using the I-LLM remains 
procyclical for conventional banks, where higher macroeconomic performance tends 
to decrease loan loss provisions (e.g. Arpa et al., 2001; Cavallo and Majnoni, 2002; 
Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 
2008 & 2012).  
  In spite of a large number of works on the procyclicality of loan loss 
provisions for conventional banks, to the best of our knowledge, there is no prior 
literature highlighting whether loan loss provisioning in Islamic banks is also 
procyclical. Hence, analyzing the procyclical issues of loan loss provisions in Islamic 
banks is  important for several reasons. 
  First, the distinctiveness of Islamic banks that comply with the precepts of 
Shariah Law makes the adoption of the AAOIFI and the E-LLM challenging, because 
Islamic banks have a unique business model, multi-layer governance and operational 
restrictions (Elnahass et al., 2016). For instance, Quittanah et al. (2011) shed light on 
the differences in accounting treatments among Islamic banks and hence, Islamic 
banks need to deal with unexpected losses due to such differences
2
. Fonseca and 
                                                          
2 PLS (profit-loss sharing) contracts that basically have two types of investment account: Restricted 
Investment Account Holder (RIAH) and Unrestricted Investment Account Holder (UIAH). These 
contracts can be reported differently in bank income statement. For instance, Karim (2001) points out 
that some Islamic banks treat RIAH as equity or liability, while others consider it as off-balance sheet 
item.  
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Gonzalez (2008) further point out that regulators require banks to absorb unexpected 
losses using bank capital, while expected losses need to be covered by loan loss 
provisions. In order to cope with unexpected lossess, Islamic banks are thus prone to 
opportunistic capital management using inflated loan loss reserves and provisions, 
because Islamic banks banks have limited funding access compared to conventional 
banks (Elnahass et al., 2016). 
  Second, given the above-mentioned doubts on the E-LLM implementation due 
to the influence of managerial discretion, and the fact that Islamic banks in several 
Middle-East countries already adopted the E-LLM since 2010 as part of the AAOIFI 
complience, it is therefore crucial to examine whether criticism on the E-LLM for 
Islamic banks around the world remains relevant. Yet, there is a growing number of 
studies advocating the advantage of the I-LLM instead of the E-LLM to mitigate 
opportunistic earnings management using loan loss provisions, although the I-LLM 
may still suffer from procyclical effects (Wezel, 2010; Bushman and Williams, 2012).  
  Third, Islamic banks have grown  rapidly. Worldwide, the total assets of 
Islamic banking have reached USD 1.2 trillion in 2015 with an estimated annual 
growth of 10-15% (Ernst & Young, 2015), while Cevic and Charap (2011) document 
that Islamic banks‟ total assets only reached USD 939 billion in 2010. Such a rapid 
development suggests an increasing role of Islamic banks in the process of economic 
development. Accordingly, addressing the procyclicality issues of loan loss provisions 
in Islamic banks should also be more of a concern in order to prevent execessive risk 
taking during economic booms and strengthen the capacity to spur lending activities 
in times of crisis, notwithstanding the importance of mitigating opportunistic bank 
management behavior using loan loss provisions.  
  Given such motivations, our contribution in this paper is twofold. Firstly, we 
examine the impact of economic growth on loan loss provisions in Islamic banks and 
hence, highlight whether or not loan loss provisioning in Islamic banks around the 
world is procyclical. Secondly, we augment the analysis by assessing whether 
overcoming discretionary managerial behavior using loan loss provisions, as part of 
the enhancement of good governance in Islamic banks, may affect the link between 
economic growth and loan loss provisions itself. In this regard, assessing the influence 
of discretionary managerial behavior during economic expansionary periods might 
indicate whether or not the use of the E-LLM affected by certain managerial 
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discretions can be detrimental to promoting the countercyclicality of loan loss 
provisions in Islamic banks.  
  Building on the prior literature for conventional banks (e.g. Bouvatier and 
Lepetit, 2008 & 2012; Anandarajan et al., 2007), this paper focuses on the influence 
of three major discretionary managerial actions using loan loss provisions. These 
include capital management, income smoothing, and signaling. In terms of capital 
management using loan loss provisions, relying on bank managerial discretion in 
building up loan loss provisions may allow banks to inflate loan loss reserves, 
particularly for banks with capital ratios close to violating minimum capital 
requirements (Anandarajan et al., 2007). Loan loss provisions can also be used by 
bank managers to smooth income, because lower earnings volatility tend to convey a 
positive signal to investors that bank riskiness remains manageable (e.g. Collins et al., 
1995; Ahmed et al., 1999; Anandarajan et al., 2007). The signaling theory also 
postulates that loan loss provisions can be used as a tool to for signaling future 
earnings (e.g. Beaver and Engel, 1996; Ahmed et al., 1999; Anandarajan et al., 2007). 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our 
data and hypotheses development. Section 3 presents our methodology and variables. 
Section 4 describes empirical results, while Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Data and hypotheses development  
2.1.  Data sources 
  For the purpose of this study, we retrieve a sample of 146 Islamic banks 
around the world from 1997 to 2012 covered by BankScope Fitch IBCA. Specifically, 
we retrieve balance sheet and income statement information of Islamic banks from the 
following countries: United Arab Emirates (10), Bangladesh (2), Bahrain (19), Brunei 
Darussalam (1), Egypt (2), UK (5), Gambia (1), Indonesia (3), Iraq (6), Iran (16), 
Jordan (3), Kuwait (9), Cayman Islands (1), Lebanon (3), Mauritania (2), Maldives 
(1), Malaysia (17), Philippines (1), Pakistan (9), Palestinian Territory (2), Qatar (4), 
Russia (1), Saudi Arabia (4), Sudan (12), Singapore (1), Syiria (2), Tunisia (1), 
Turkey (4), and Yemen (4)
3
. We also include macroeconomic data such as real gross 
domestic product obtained from the World Bank.  
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 The number of banks are in parentheses. 
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2.2.  Hypothesis development 
  As stated earlier, the objective of this study is twofold. First, we aim to test 
whether the procyclicality of loan loss provisions actually occurs by running 
regressions of loan loss provisions on economic growth as the explanatory variable of 
interest. Second, we test whether the procyclicality of loan loss provisions is 
conditional on Islamic banks‟ discretionary managerial action comprising capital 
management, income smoothing and signaling. For such purposes, we specify 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 to tackle the first and second objective, respectively:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Islamic banks hold lower loan loss provisions following higher 
economic growth and hence, loan loss provisioning in Islamic banks remains 
procyclical. 
 
Hypothesis 2 : The effect of economic growth on loan loss provisions depends on the 
extent to which Islamic bank managers act opportunistically using loan loss 
provisions for capital management, income smoothing or signaling.  
 
  Previous studies indeed document that discretionary capital management may 
affect loan loss provisioning behavior of banks (Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; Parker 
and Zhu, 2012). Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) report that banks with poor 
capitalization are less inclined to build up loan loss provisions, while Parker and Zhu 
(2012) show that income smoothing strategies tend to be adopted in well-capitalized 
banks in Japan and poorly-capitalized banks in India. In this context, the role of bank 
capital management and income smoothing can not be separated in examining the 
issues of procyclicality in banking. Phrased differently, aside from capital 
management, income smoothing using loan loss provisions should also be examined 
regarding its impact on the procyclicality of loan loss provisions. In parallel, signaling 
strategies using loan loss provisions are also somehow related to income smoothing 
strategies, as banks may signal their strength when they can generate higher profits 
and, thus, loan loss provisions. For such reasons, Hypothesis 2 considers not only the 
discretionary behavior of Islamic related to capital management, but also income 
smoothing and signaling to examine whether the impact of economic growth on loan 
loss provisions depends on managerial discretion.    
3. Methodology and variables 
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  The methodology used in this paper comprises two stages. In the first stage, 
we test for the possible presence of a procyclical effect of loan loss provisions as 
stated in Hypothesis 1, while the second stage is to examine whether capital 
management, income smoothing or signaling using loan loss provisions during 
economic boom can exacerbate or offset the procyclicality of loan loss provisions as 
in Hypothesis 2.  
  Hypothesis 1 can be tested using the following equations in which we 
introduce the one-year-lagged value of the dependent variable as a regressor. 
 tititititi GROWTHNPLLTALLPTALLPTA ,3,2,11,0,           (1a) 
 tititititi GROWTHNPLLTALLRTALLRTA ,3,2,11,0,           (1b) 
In Eq. (1a) and Eq. (1b), we merely focus on the determinants of loan loss provisions 
that may reflect non-discretionary behavior of bank managers, because the 
procyclicality of loan loss provisions is mostly related to the non-discretionary 
component of loan loss provisions (Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008 & 2012). On the 
other hand, adding more variables reflecting the discretionary component of loan loss 
provisions into Eq. (1a) and Eq. (1b) reduces the degree of freedom when we only 
have a limited number of Islamic banks available in our sample.  From Eq. (1a), 
LLPTA is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets. For robustness 
considerations, we also use the ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets (LLRTA) as a 
dependent variable in Eq. (1b). LTA is the ratio of total loans to total assets, while 
NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans and GROWTH is the real gross 
domestic product growth at the country level.  
  In the next turn, Hypothesis 2 can be tested using the following equations in 
which we add interaction terms between economic growth and a proxy of 
discretionary managerial actions in Islamic banks related to capital management, 
income smoothing and signaling.  
 
 
ti
titititi
GROWTHCAPCAP
GROWTHNPLLTALLPTALLPTA
,54
3,2,11,0,
* 


 
       (2a) 
 
ti
titititi
GROWTHCAPCAP
GROWTHNPLLTALLPTALLRTA
,54
3,2,11,0,
* 


 
         (2b) 
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ti
titititi
GROWTHEBTPEBTP
GROWTHNPLLTALLPTALLPTA
,54
3,2,11,0,
* 


 
         (2c) 
 
ti
titititi
GROWTHEBTPEBTP
GROWTHNPLLTALLPTALLRTA
,54
3,2,11,0,
* 


 
         (2d) 
    
ti
titititi
GROWTHSIGNSIGN
GROWTHNPLLTALLPTALLPTA
,54
3,2,11,0,
* 


 
         (2e) 
 
ti
titititi
GROWTHSIGNSIGN
GROWTHNPLLTALLPTALLRTA
,54
3,2,11,0,
* 


 
         (2f) 
 
Eq. (2a) and Eq. (2b) contain the interaction terms between capitalization and 
economic growth (CAP*GROWTH) in order to examine the role of discretionary 
managerial actions related to capital management, in affecting the impact of economic 
growth on loan loss provisions. CAP is defined as the ratio of total equity to total 
assets. Meanwhile, the role of income smoothing related discretionary managerial 
actions in affecting the link between economic growth and loan loss provisions is 
estimated using Eq. (2c) and Eq. (2d). In these equations, we incorporate the 
interaction terms between income smoothing and economic growth 
(EBTP*GROWTH). EBTP is the income smoothing variable defined as the ratio of 
earning before tax and provisions divided by total assets following Bouvatier and 
Lepetit (2008). Finally, Eq. (2e) and Eq. (2f) contain the interactions term between a 
signaling measure and economic growth (SIGN*GROWTH), which aims to 
investigate how signaling managerial behavior affects the link between economic 
growth and loan loss provisions. SIGN captures signaling behavior, which is 
measured by:  
)(5.0 ,1,
,1,
,
titi
titi
ti
TATA
ERER
SIGN





 
ER is defined as earnings before tax and loan loss provisions, while TA is total assets. 
Again, we follow Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008 & 2012) in measuring the above-
mentioned signaling behavior.  This variable basically reflects the share of one-year-
ahead-change of earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions in total assets, where 
higher values indicate that the power of generating future earnings is strong enough to 
absorb potential losses. Banks conducting signaling will build up loan loss provisions 
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due to higher prospects of future earnings in order to convey signals to the market that 
they behave prudently. 
  Overall, we estimate Eq. (1a) to Eq. (2f) using dynamic panel data techniques 
for several reasons. First, the current loan loss provisioning behavior might be 
affected by the last year‟s provisioning behavior due to managerial learning and, thus, 
the loan loss provisions variable is a dynamic rather than static variable. Therefore, 
the use of dynamic panel data techniques is relevant to control for dynamic 
movements of loan loss provisions. Second, loan loss provisions can be affected by 
explanatory variables introduced from Eq. (1a) to Eq. (2f), but those explanatory 
variables can also be affected by loan loss provisions. If this is the case, reverse 
causality problems might be an important drawback that requires particular attention. 
The use of dynamic panel data methodology is also relevant, because it can avoid 
reverse causality problems between loan loss provisions and their determinants.  
  In terms of econometric procedure, we follow Blundell and Bond (1998) to 
estimate dynamic panel data models as shown in Eq. (1a) – Eq.(2f). This method is 
referred to as the two-step system GMM estimation or the system GMM. The system 
GMM is shown to be more efficient than the standard GMM (Baltagi, 2005). We 
further consider orthogonal transformations of instruments to control for possible 
cross-sectional fixed effects, while we also include Windmeijer‟s (2005) finite sample 
correction to ensure for the validity of the system GMM. Finally, the system GMM is 
valid when both the AR(2) and Hansen-J test are not significant, indicating that there 
is no second order autocorrelation among errors, and overidentifying restrictions are 
valid, respectively.   
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Results discussion 
  In Table 1, we present descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. 
No potential outliers can be detected, as the values of each variable seem 
economically plausible. We also eliminate all zero values for each variable to ensure 
that unavailable data is not treated as zero in our model estimations.  Meanwhile, 
Table 2 presents the correlation structure of all variables. We can notice that all the 
independent variables presented from Eq. (1a) to Eq. (2f) are not highly correlated 
and hence, potential multicollinearity problems are less likely to occur.  
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[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here] 
 
  Considering the orthogonal deviations transformation of instruments in the 
system GMM estimation, Table 3 then documents that Islamic banks indeed use loan 
loss provisions for non-discretionary purposes in which higher loan-to-asset ratio 
(LTA) and non-performing loans (NPL) are associated with higher loan loss 
provisions. These results are consistent with prior literature on the procyclicality of 
loan loss provisions in conventional banks (e.g. Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008 & 2012; 
Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005).  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
  Moreover, we also find that loan loss provisions of Islamic banks are 
procyclical, because higher economic growth deteriorates loan loss provisions as 
shown in Table 3. Although our sample period already covers 2012, when at least 
three countries (i.e. Bahrain, Jordan, and Qatar) had implemented the E-LLM as part 
of the AAOIFI complience as of 2010 (Elnahass et al., 2016), the fact that procyclical 
issues still occur may cast doubts on the effectiveness of the E-LLM to promote the 
countercyclicality of loan loss provisions. Yet, the coefficients of economic growth 
(GROWTH) in Table 3 are not only statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels 
using either LLPTA and LLRTA as a dependent variable, respectively; they are also 
economically important.  
  If we use LLPTA as a measure of loan loss provisions, a one-standard 
deviation increase in economic growth (GROWTH) leads a decline in loan loss 
provisions by 8.73% of its mean (from 0.76% to 0.69%). Provided the standard 
deviation of GROWTH equals to 0.5%, this result can also be interpreted by indicating 
that a 1% increase in economic growth (i.e. a two-standard deviation increase in 
GROWTH) is associated with a decline in loan loss provisions by 17.4% of its mean 
(from 0.76% to 0.63%). Similarly, if we use LLRTA as a measure of loan loss 
reserves, a one-standard deviation increase in economic growth deteriorates loan loss 
reserves by 7.2% of its mean (from 2.6% to 2.4%). Phrased differently, a 1% increase 
in economic growth tends to deteriorate loan loss reserves by 14.4% of its mean (from 
2.6% to 2.2%. 
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   From these results, Hypothesis 1 is therefore not rejected, suggesting that 
Islamic banks' loan loss provisions is procyclical. Our dynamic panel data models to 
test Hypothesis 1 are also valid, because both the AR(2) and Hansen-J test are not 
significant. Such procyclical behavior of Islamic banks in building up loan loss 
provisions is indeed consistent with the results obtained for conventional banks in 
prior literature described earlier (Arpa et al., 2001; Cavallo and Majnoni, 2002; 
Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 
2008 & 2012). 
  Furthermore, we present our empirical results to test Hypothesis 2 in Table 4. 
Model 1 is addressed to test whether capital management behavior using loan loss 
provisions affects the procyclicality of loan loss provisions, while Model 2 and Model 
3 are to test the impact of income smoothing and signaling behavior using loan loss 
provisions on the procyclicality of loan loss provisions, respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
  From Table 4, it is shown that higher loan loss provisions are still affected by 
the loan-to-assets ratio (LTA) and non-performing loans (NPL). In this context, the use 
of loan loss provisions for non-discetionary purposes as discussed earlier is not 
altered. Meanwhile, economic growth (GROWTH) still has a negative impact on loan 
loss provisions (LLPTA) or loan loss reserves (LLRTA) and hence, loan loss 
provisioning remains procyclical in this regard. Moreover, Table 4 further highlights 
that Islamic bank managers also use loan loss provisions only for opportunistic capital 
management (Model 1), but not for earnings management (Model 2) or signaling 
(Model 3).  
  As the link between CAP and LLPTA (or LLRTA) is negative, this also means 
that loan loss provisions (LLPTA) or loan loss reserves (LLRTA) are inflated due to a 
decline in bank capital ratio (CAP), a result that is consistent with Anandarajan et al. 
(2007). If we use LLPTA as the dependent variable, a one standard deviation decline 
in the capital ratio leads to an increase in loan loss provisions by 40% of its mean 
(from 0.74% to 0.45%). If LLRTA is used as the dependent variable,  a one standard 
deviation decline in the capital ratio leads to an increase in loan loss reserves by 
11.8% of its mean (from 2.6% to 2.9%). It is also shown that the link between bank 
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capital ratio and loan loss provisioning is not only statistically significant as in Table 
4, but is also economically noteworthy.  
  Despite the negative link between bank capitalization and loan loss 
provisioning, indicating opportunistic capital management behavior, we find that the 
coefficient of the interaction term between bank capitalization and economic growth 
(CAP*GROWTH) becomes positive as reported in Model 1 (Table 4). This positive 
coefficient also has a higher value than the absolute values of the negative coefficients 
of CAP and GROWTH as standalone variables.  
  Compared to the negative coefficient of CAP, the positive coefficient of 
CAP*GROWTH indicates that opportunistic capital management practices using loan 
loss provisions dissapear when economic growth reaches a certain level (i.e. 6.8% or 
6.3% when we use LLPTA or LLRTA as the dependent variable, respectively). 
Although higher economic growth may mitigate the extent to which opportunistic 
capital management takes place using loan loss provisions in Islamic banks, economic 
growth is an exogenous factor that cannot be controlled by bank management. 
Accordingly, it is rather difficult to rely on higher economic growth, particulary 
following the 2008 global financial crisis, in order to deal with opportunistic capital 
management using loan loss provisions.  
  Similarly, the results presented in Model 1 (Table 4) further imply that the 
procyclicality of loan loss provisioning can be mitigated at least after a certain level of 
sufficient bank capital ratio has been reached, which may in turn prevent 
opportunistic bank management behavior to inflate loan loss reserves and provisions 
(Anandarajan et al., 2007). For instance, if LLPTA is used as the dependent variable, 
the negative impact of GROWTH on loan loss provisions indicating the procyclicality 
of loan loss provisions occurs when CAP is less than 24%. On the contrary, the 
countercyclical effect of loan loss provisions occurs when CAP exceeds 24% in which 
higher economic growth is linked to higher loan loss provisions. If LLRTA is used as 
the dependent variable, the cut off point remains unclear, but higher economic growth 
leads to higher loan loss reserves for banks holding more capital (CAP) in general.  
  Overall, loan loss provisions in Islamic banks may be countercyclical for well-
capitalized banks, provided that such banks do not suffer from opportunistic 
managerial behavior related to capital management using loan loss provisions when 
bank capital is high enough to mitigate such behavior. Finally, our models estimated 
in Table 4 are valid (the AR(2) test and the Hansen-J test are not significant).  
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4.2. Robustness checks 
  In order to ensure the robustness of our empirical models, we modify the 
specification of our dynamic panel data models. Specifically, we follow Bouvatier 
and Lepetit (2008) by considering first-difference transformation instead of the 
orthogonal deviation transformation of instruments. Table 5 and Table 6 present our 
results using this new specification. On the whole, the empirical results discussed 
earlier are not altered. All dynamic panel data models using first difference 
transformation of instruments are still valid ( the AR(2) test and the Hansen-J test are 
not rejected). 
 
[Insert Table 5 and Table 6 here] 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
This paper is the first to examine whether the loan loss provisioning of Islamic 
banks is procyclical through the business cycle. Our empirical results show that loan 
loss provisions in Islamic banks are generally procyclical. Specifically, loan loss 
provisions decrease when economic growth is stronger. Such procyclicality is 
observed despite  the fact that a dynamic provisioning system using the E-LLM as 
part of the AAOIFI compliance has been adopted by various countries at least since 
2010. This may highlight that in general, the implementation of the E-LLM may not 
be effective yet in dealing with the procyclicality of loan loss provisioning. 
Accordingly, Islamic banks‟ provisioning behavior might deepen economic 
recessions, as loan loss provisions increase in response to a decline in economic 
growth.  
Moreover, we find that loan loss provisions might also be used by Islamic 
bank managers to act opportunistically to increase bank capital. It is shown that higher 
capitalization tends to deteriorate loan loss reserves and reserves in Islamic banks 
consistent with the findings of Anandarajan et al. (2007) for conventional banks. 
Conversely, Islamic bank managers tend to inflate loan loss reserves and provisions 
when bank capital ratio declines. A closer investigation further reveals that the 
procyclicality of loan loss provisioning can be offset by higher Islamic bank 
capitalization. Specifically, Islamic banks with higher capitalization are more inclined 
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to build up loan loss reserves and provisions during economic booms. Loan loss 
provisioning becomes countercyclical in this regard.  
  The findings of this paper provide various implications for bank regulators, 
managers, and investors. Because the use of the I-LLM and the E-LLM has become a 
lively debate (Bushman and Williams, 2012; Wezel, 2010), this paper provides 
insights to bank regulators, whether adopting a dynamic provisioning system using 
the E-LLM recommended by the AAOIFI should be made mandatory for Islamic 
banks around the world, in order to overcome procyclical issues that exacerbate bank 
risk taking during economic booms, and increase bank risk aversion in times of crisis.  
This paper however casts doubts on the call for a dynamic provisioning system 
using the E-LLM to overcome procyclical issues for Islamic banks. Because the E-
LLM is influenced by managerial discretionary behavior using loan loss provisions, it 
may also cause opportunistic capital management (Bushman and Williams, 2012; 
Wezel, 2010) or earnings management (Elnahass et al., 2016). Likewise, our 
empirical results suggest that Islamic banks around the world could also be using loan 
loss provisions for opportunistic capital management purposes in which managers 
inflate loan loss reserves and provisions when bank capital declines. Yet, the 
procyclicality issues of loan loss provisions can already be resolved by enhancing 
bank capitalization, implying that opportunistic capital management using loan loss 
provisions can also be mitigated by enhancing bank capitalization. This is because 
only banks with lower capital ratios are likely to inflate loan loss reserves and 
provisions to maintain sufficient capitalization (Anandarajan et al., 2007; Bouvatier 
and Lepetit, 2012).   
For Islamic bank managers and investors, the findings of this paper also 
highlight the importance of strengthening capitalization through increasing revenue 
generating capacity, efficiency and competitiveness in the market, because higher 
market power may increase the extent to which banks may raise more capital at least 
in the context of conventional banks (Berger et al., 2009; Soedarmono et al., 2013).  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LLPTA Ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets 694 0.0075819 0.0151546 -0.126497 0.1412412 
LLRTA Ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets 702 0.0264963 0.0379222 0.000113 0.4414414 
LTA Ratio of total loans to total assets 999 0.4747414 0.2548028 0.00000241 0.9927928 
NPL Ratio of non-performing loans to total assets 417 0.0870674 0.1334875 0.0000941 0.831972 
GROWTH Real gross domestic product growth 1684 0.0469603 0.0542033 -0.413 0.465 
CAP Ratio of total equity to total assets 1050 0.2621883 0.2636642 -0.5892856 1 
EBTP Ratio of earning before tax and provisions to total assets 724 0.0182807 0.043667 -0.4108263 0.2611041 
SIGN Signaling variable 585 0.0044359 0.0427708 -0.3834767 0.3486663 
 
Table 2. Correlation structure 
Variables LLPTA LLRTA LTA NPL GROWTH CAP EBTP SIGN 
LLPTA 1 
       LLRTA 0.2766 1 
      LTA 0.143 0.3512 1 
     NPL 0.3699 0.7021 0.0009 1 
    GROWTH -0.0648 -0.002 0.0428 -0.0077 1 
   CAP -0.1161 0.1479 0.0044 0.1388 0.0135 1 
  EBTP -0.1322 0.0619 0.3473 -0.1635 0.1967 -0.0158 1 
 SIGN 0.0123 -0.004 0.0188 -0.1135 -0.0321 -0.0018 -0.6156 1 
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Table 3. The procyclicality of loan loss provisions 
Explanatory variables 
Dependent variables 
LLPTA LLRTA 
  
 
  
LLPTA(-1) 0.6973***   
  (0.144)   
LLRTA(-1) 
 
0.7768*** 
  
 
(0.035) 
LTA 0.0042*** 0.0091*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
NPL 0.0130 0.0619*** 
  (0.022) (0.013) 
GROWTH -0.0245** -0.0500*** 
  (0.009) (0.017) 
  
 
  
Observations 311 310 
Number of banks 73 72 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.981 0.350 
Hansen-J test (p-value) 0.420 0.126 
Notes:  The definition of variables follows Table 1. Regressions are carried out using the system GMM following Blundell and Bond (1998) by taking 
orthogonal deviation of instruments into account and hence, we control for cross-sectional fixed effects. Models are valid if the AR(2) and Hansen-J test are 
not significant. ***, **, *  indicate significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.   
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Table 4. Do capital management, income smoothing and signaling using loan loss provisions alter procyclical effects? 
Explanatory variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
LLPTA LLRTA LLPTA LLRTA LLPTA LLRTA 
 
            
LLPTA(-1) 0.6137***   0.6721***   0.5889***   
 
(0.105)   (0.121)   (0.162)   
LLRTA(-1)   0.8107***   0.7761***   0.8826*** 
 
  (0.051)   (0.051)   (0.088) 
LTA 0.0109*** 0.0099*** 0.0066*** 0.0095*** 0.0048* 0.0095** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
NPL 0.0143 0.0587*** 0.0081 0.0570** 0.0288 0.0315 
 
(0.019) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.037) 
GROWTH -0.0814*** -0.0097 -0.0333 -0.0506*** -0.0204** -0.0600** 
 
(0.030) (0.042) (0.025) (0.017) (0.010) (0.023) 
CAP -0.0233** -0.0169* 
 
      
 
(0.013) (0.010) 
 
      
CAP * GROWTH 0.3425*** 0.2666** 
 
      
 
(0.189) (0.342) 
 
      
EBTP     -0.0546 0.0052     
 
    (0.039) (0.045)     
EBTP *GROWTH     0.4644 -0.2104     
 
    (0.746) (0.609)     
SIGN         -0.0344 0.0177 
 
        (0.063) (0.059) 
SIGN*GROWTH         0.0099 -0.0764 
 
        (0.440) (0.737) 
 
            
Observations 311 310 311 300 256 249 
Number of banks 73 72 73 68 68 64 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.724 0.342 0.946 0.351 0.398 0.355 
Hansen-J test (p-value) 0.453 0.155 0.325 0.083 0.554 0.145 
Notes:  The definition of variables follows Table 1. Regressions are carried out using the system GMM following Blundell and Bond (1988) by taking 
orthogonal deviation of instruments into account and hence, we control for cross-sectional fixed effects. Models are valid if the AR(2) and Hansen-J test are 
not significant. ***, **, *  indicate significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.   
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Table 5. The procyclicality of loan loss provisions (First-difference transformation)  
Explanatory wariables 
Dependent variables 
LLPTA LLRTA 
  
 
  
LLPTA(-1) 0.6474***   
  (0.146)   
LLRTA(-1) 
 
0.7247*** 
  
 
(0.040) 
LTA 0.0045*** 0.0112*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
NPL 0.0147 0.0604*** 
  (0.023) (0.018) 
GROWTH -0.0202* -0.0470** 
  (0.013) (0.020) 
  
 
  
Observations 311 310 
Number of banks 73 72 
AR(2) test: p-Val 0.938 0.349 
Hansen-J test: p-Val 0.323 0.107 
Notes:  The definition of variables follows Table 1. Regressions are carried out using the system GMM following Blundell and Bond (1998) by taking first-
difference transformation of instruments into account and hence, we control for cross-sectional fixed effects. Models are valid if the AR(2) and Hansen-J test 
are not significant. ***, **, *  indicate significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.   
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Table 6. Effects of capital management, income smoothing and signaling on procyclical issues (First-difference transformation)  
Explanatory variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
LLPTA LLRTA LLPTA LLRTA LLPTA LLRTA 
 
            
LLPTA(-1) 0.5643***   0.6330***   0.5889***   
 
(0.101)   (0.128)   (0.162)   
LLRTA(-1)   0.7619***   0.7245*** 0.0048* 0.8826*** 
 
  (0.045)   (0.046) (0.003) (0.088) 
LTA 0.0125*** 0.0132*** 0.0050 0.0124*** 0.0288 0.0095** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.030) (0.004) 
NPL 0.0198 0.0578*** 0.0113 0.0533** -0.0204** 0.0315 
 
(0.021) (0.016) (0.024) (0.024) (0.010) (0.037) 
GROWTH -0.0941*** -0.0138 -0.0058 -0.0505***   -0.0600** 
 
(0.032) (0.039) (0.046) (0.019)   (0.023) 
CAP -0.0302** -0.0120 
 
      
 
(0.015) (0.012) 
 
      
CAP * GROWTH 0.4450** -0.1952 
 
      
 
(0.217) (0.302) 
 
      
EBTP     -0.0045 -0.0050     
 
    (0.083) (0.038)     
EBTP *GROWTH     -0.5048 -0.0052     
 
    (1.713) (0.346)     
SIGN         -0.0344 0.0177 
 
        (0.063) (0.059) 
SIGN*GROWTH         0.0099 -0.0764 
 
        (0.440) (0.737) 
 
            
Observations 311 310 311 300 256 249 
Number of banks 73 72 73 68 68 64 
AR(2) test: p-Val 0.707 0.341 0.962 0.351 0.398 0.355 
Hansen-J test: p-Val 0.431 0.195 0.302 0.051 0.554 0.145 
Notes:  The definition of variables follows Table 1. Regressions are carried out using the system GMM following Blundell and Bond (1998) by taking first-
difference transformation of instruments into account and hence, we control for cross-sectional fixed effects. Models are valid if the AR(2) and Hansen-J test 
are not significant. ***, **, *  indicate significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
